The dismissal of the Covid lab leak theory shows the perils of scientists turning into campaigners

When researchers think it’s their duty to promote particular ends, their advice should come with a massive health warning

It’s time to talk about the lab leak theory. Actually, it’s well past time. Much of the world may be trying to move on and forget the coronavirus, but there are still major unanswered questions about how it all began. And with every new piece of information divulged by authorities, we seem to discover another senior scientist involved in hidden discussions about whether Covid leaked from a Chinese laboratory, conversations that give a very different impression to the one scientists promoted publicly.

The latest batch of documents obtained by US journalist Jimmy Tobias show that in early February 2020 our own chief scientific adviser, Sir Patrick Vallance, was involved in an email exchange about an influential research paper on the origins of the virus. When the paper was published in March, it put the kibosh on the lab leak theory. Thenceforth, few eminent scientists would go near it.

But the private emails being exchanged about the matter now show that experts in the field did not agree its evidence was as strong as it claimed. Apparently ignoring these concerns, Sir Patrick called the research “a really important piece of work” and suggested the contested point be “given further weight” as showing the virus could not have been created in a lab.

Now I don’t want to exaggerate. This is not a “smoking gun” showing that Sir Patrick and his colleagues implemented a deliberate cover-up. Perhaps he missed the relevant email. Perhaps he was distracted and didn’t take it on board. But what’s clear is that every time we get a new insight into how scientists were assessing the lab theory, it paints a picture of wishful thinking, hopes prioritised over evidence, and a highly emotional backlash against ideas seen as “harmful” (for which, read “Trumpian”).

In some cases, the most vociferous denouncers of the lab leak theory were directly involved in research collaborations with Chinese government laboratories. And even as evidence emerged showing the theory was credible, scientists never went back to correct the record, admit to being conflicted, explain their previous statements or admit that they had misrepresented how they really felt.

This is an important story not so much because we can avoid a repeat by uncovering the virus’s origin – unfortunately, China will never allow a proper investigation, at least while Xi Jinping is in charge, and it has already destroyed much critical evidence. Instead, for now, we should focus on what these fragments tell us about science, politics and the flaws and motives of the exalted experts often called upon to make decisions on policies affecting millions of people.

What comes across most clearly is that “scientists” are not the same as “science” and that policy, money and campaigning, in particular, are an anathema to science.

This has become most obvious in the broader debate over Covid policy. “Follow the science” was the mantra during the pandemic, but the science was constantly changing and often proved wrong, as it is with science (this is one of the ways you know it’s science and not just storytelling).

First they said don’t mask, then they told us to mask, as the consensus on aerosol transmission fell apart. For weeks in 2020, our scientists resolutely followed a flu pandemic playbook, which called for a herd immunity strategy, only to change their minds and leave politicians to collect the blame. And in the repeated waves and revision of deaths data, we have seen the consensus over Sweden’s strategy yo-yo between “murderously reckless” to “genius”. As for the wisdom of lockdowns, that debate is still raging.

Covid is certainly not the only example. In fact, as our economy becomes more and more specialised and society becomes saturated with advanced technology, the influence of technical experts grows ever greater. Thus, the likelihood of policy errors based on flawed science grows and with it grows the stock of vested interests and people with reputations staked on mistakes. This, in turn, provides a convenient supply of “experts”, often compromised, for use by politicians and bureaucrats.

There are all sorts of examples from a wide array of fields. Remember the certainty that diesel cars were better for the environment than petrol ones? That turned out to be based on fraudulent laboratory tests. Recall how consumers were once told to cut down on fat above everything else, only to be told now that fat is far better than sugar. There was the thalidomide scandal, leading to the birth of thousands of babies with birth defects. And there is the ongoing unravelling of the use of supposedly “harmless” puberty blockers in children who say they are trans. All of these mistakes have caused real and irreparable harm.

Many sceptics would, of course, like to bracket the science of climate change in the same category as these scientific catastrophes. This seems to me a reckless move. Climate change is a theory developed and tested over many years by a diverse range of people and institutions in many countries and it therefore seems highly likely to be true.

But when I read about scientists wishing away the lab leak theory, it underlines a vital point: we need to preserve the distinction between the scientific process and the infallible public face of “science” often presented to justify policy. When scientists slip into the role of campaigners who see it as their duty to promote or protect particular ends, whether it’s “racial justice”, their own well-funded research collaborations or Cop27, their advice should come with a massive health warning.

Some of the scientists involved in downplaying the lab leak theory might argue to themselves that their actions did no harm and protected “science” (by which they might mean their Chinese funding streams). But they are deluding themselves.

Perhaps, if these prominent scientists hadn’t prematurely debunked the idea that Covid came from a lab, the public would have feared the virus earlier and reacted faster to social distancing guidance. Perhaps when Australia asked for an independent Covid investigation, it would have carried enough moral authority that Beijing would have thought twice about sanctioning its exporters and bullying other countries into submission.

Perhaps some Chinese whistleblower, emboldened by the prospect of respectable Western supporters, might have leaked critical information. And perhaps we would have taken action to root out the huge, moneyed network of collaborations going on between Western universities and Chinese researchers building Beijing’s military and surveillance state.

Then again, maybe this last possibility is exactly what our scientists feared most. During the pandemic, ministers always told us to “follow the science”. In this case, we might have done better to follow the money.